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Being In Uncertainties, Mysteries, Doubt1 
(Commentary on Marks-Tarlow’s “A Fractal Epistemology for Transpersonal Psychology”)
William J. Coburn2
Institute of Contemporary Psychoanalysis,  
Los Angeles, CA, USA  
I was once, or, I should say, many times, out of my body. This was when, decades ago, sensory deprivation tanks were de rigueur on Wilshire 
Boulevard in Los Angeles. I can reliably say I had 
transcendental experiences, some of which were 
“out of body,” but then once the black, warm 
saltwater catapulted me into a panic attack, that was 
it for me. Never again. I often wonder what additional 
frontiers, new landscapes, I could have explored had 
I not panicked. So much for the rational part of my 
brain. I cannot deny I have had other edge-of-my-
seat experiences subsequently; perhaps I could call 
them transcendental, but never in the confines of a 
coffin-like tank. How can I account for them? And 
why the panic?
Unlike many other paradigms in the broader 
field of psychology, transpersonal psychology, 
and therapy, has never been squeamish about the 
anomaly, the novel, the unexpected. An exceptional 
contribution, Marks-Tarlow’s article (2020, this issue; 
subsequent citations refer to this article) is a welcome 
and expansive deepening of our understanding and 
exploration of our intensely idiosyncratic experiential 
worlds, through fresh eyes and a unique perspective. 
Transpersonal psychology’s emphasis on the 
whole person, on not pathologizing, on not reducing 
what is human to categorical caricatures, deeply 
resonates not only with my own contemporary 
clinical and philosophical sensibilities, but also with 
a variety of burgeoning contextualist psychoanalytic 
perspectives beginning in the 1970’s (e.g., Atwood 
& Stolorow, 1979). To my mind, Marks-Tarlow 
substantially extends these sensibilities in her 
engaging exploration of fractal geometry. She 
addresses the transpersonal divide—essentially 
between an unremitting emphasis on emotional 
phenomenology, on the one hand, and the need 
for objective verification and explanation of such 
phenomena, empirically and objectivist based, 
on the other hand. This debate can be witnessed 
today in psychoanalysis wherein arguments 
about phenomenological contextualism versus 
neuroscientific study of the brain continue to 
unfold. And happily, there are integrationists, such 
as Seligman (2005), who aim to incorporate a 
complexity sensibility into both sides of the debate. 
Marks-Tarlow highlights the Friedman-Ferrer 
argument: Friedman’s claim to objectivity, posits 
Ferrer, is “guilty of its own charge” (p. xx). Every 
perspective, is, well, just that, a perspective—one 
of many. There is no view from nowhere (Nagel, 
1986). Marks-Tarlow aims to heal this divide, “an 
ever-widening schism between these two positions” 
(p. xx). She proposes the mathematics of fractal 
geometry as “model, method, and metaphor for 
otherwise ambiguous and inaccessible transpersonal 
phenomena” (p. xx). 
Why do we need corroborative evidence to 
substantiate our transpersonal experiences? Why are 
we intrigued by an FMRI that affords us a peek at our 
neuronal infrastructure? Is that where the action is? 
Is it our human propensity to want to validate and 
concretize our lived, subjective experience, born of 
our unique organizing principles and interpretative 
activity, that gives rise to what we consider to be true 
and real? Perhaps. Perhaps we need to feel that what 
A unification bridging and superseding the Newtonian-Galilean worldview on the one side and the 
romantic worldview on the other, bringing together mind and matter, the human sciences and the 
natural sciences, is to be found in an inclusive phenomenology—one that recognizes the physical world 
as but a domain of experience (instead of the absolute and exclusive foundation of the Real).
—George Atwood [George Atwood’s Deep Thoughts Journal (online), 2017, p. 5] 
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we experience is indeed true and real. Descartes 
was a glaring example of our human proclivity for 
fundamental doubt, search for clarity, and “irritable 
grasping after fact and reason” (Keats, 1817/1899, p. 
277), while eventually also the epitome of having to 
arrive at conclusions that felt rational and reliable. 
Was my own panic simple claustrophobia, or was it 
perhaps an emergent property and product of having 
my heretofore “true and real” world confronted, 
opposed, and turned on its head?
If we are to apply a more scientifically rigorous 
model to transpersonal phenomena, personally I 
cannot think of a more conducive and persuasive 
methodology than fractal geometry, as beautifully 
outlined by Marks-Tarlow. Fractal geometry is 
uniquely suited for mapping and understanding 
seemingly messy natural phenomena—the noise 
in the universe, reiterated throughout innumerable 
mass, space, and time scales, that philosophers and 
scientists traditionally tended to ignore or dismiss 
as irrelevant anomalies. Generally our universe had 
been neat, tidy, and rational. While Newton and 
others may have stood on the shoulders of giants, 
their view was not far-reaching enough to anticipate 
the radical complexity of our lives and of our world 
in which we are relentlessly embedded. Complexity 
theorists from a variety of disciplines such as Poincare 
and Guillaume (1900), Lorenz (1963), Bertalanffy 
(1968), Laszlo (1972), Kauffman (1995), Bak (1996), 
and Cilliers (1998), just to name a few, fortuitously 
introduced to us a multi-faceted, groundbreaking 
paradigm with which we can grasp an exponentially 
richer and more complex view of how our world 
works. And this sensibility has advantageously 
infiltrated the fields of psychology and psychoanalysis 
(Thelen & Smith, 1994, 2005; Stolorow, 1997; Piers, 
2000; Marks-Tarlow, 2011; Seligman, 2005; Coburn, 
2014; and many others), offering us a deeper glance 
into and respect for the complexity of human 
experiencing and meaning-making—I believe, one 
of the hallmarks of the endeavor of transpersonal 
psychology. Intertwined within a complex systems 
framework is the fractal geometry with which Marks-
Tarlow elegantly bridges the Friedman-Ferrer divide.
That said, coming from a complexity, context-
ualist, and phenomenologically based perspective in 
contemporary psychoanalysis, my own bias resides 
in eschewing any notions of objectivity insofar as 
such objectivism presumes a clear and pristine view 
of psychological or even natural phenomena. Each of 
us is relentlessly situated, and each of our respective 
situatednesses is as individually and uniquely 
contoured as the fractals about which Marks-Tarlow 
writes. Admittedly, many of us wish for an objective 
world with objective facts, one we can rely upon, 
one familiar to us, one we can awake to tomorrow 
morning—hence our “irritable grasping after fact and 
reason.” Adam Phillips (1999) once remarked: “Fear 
of the unknown [and I would add, of transpersonal 
experience] is cured through flight into the intelligible… 
The familiar, the unsurprising, restores our collusive 
sanity” (pp. 110–111). And in the clinical realm, as I 
have written elsewhere, “there is nothing quite like the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual if you are looking 
for a convenient device to reduce the complexity 
and contextuality of experiencing and meaning-
making down to two-dimensional caricatures of what 
is human” (2014, p. 62). Flight into the intelligible 
obscures our existential panic.
Marks-Tarlow ambitiously offers us a “novel 
epistemology for transpersonal psychology” and, 
I believe, thereby advances our field in directions 
useful in not only narrowing the epistemological 
divide, but also in privileging “what is unique, 
irregular, and rare in nature, including [most notably] 
human subjective experience” (p. xx). She tells us, 
“transpersonal psychology is in need of a more 
holistic scientific/mathematical fractal framework 
that helps to embrace the full breadth and depth 
of its psychological and experiential scope” (p. xx). 
And I would argue further that fractal geometry in 
particular, alongside our contextualist paradigms 
that privilege non-reductionist, non-pathologizing, 
non-objectivist perspectives, can only improve 
and expand any domain that takes the slightest 
interest in human experiencing and its attendant 
meanings—the stranger and more unique, the better! 
Strangeness, uniqueness, creativity, and novelty 
are quintessentially human. And this sensibility is 
especially vital in the consultation room.
Of her many reflections on fractals, Marks-
Tarlow references the sticky problem of consciousness 
and conscious awareness. And while she states that 
she is not offering us a theory of consciousness per 
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se, she does assert, vis-à-vis fractal geometry, that 
the “structure of subjective experience” includes 
“open boundaries between conscious awareness 
and physical, natural levels of brain, body, and 
surrounding environment” (p. xx). I concur: There can 
be no consciousness without world, and no world 
without consciousness. The two are relentlessly and 
inextricably intertwined, and evolutionarily have 
always been mutually constitutive. This is the radical 
contextualism that drives my clinical work, including 
my assumption that my patients’ experiences are not 
epiphenomena and always emerge at the interface 
of one’s history, one’s present, one’s imagined future, 
one’s physical state, one’s relations with others, and 
one’s world in general. 
Marks-Tarlow speaks of the “subjective 
feeling of fuzzy boundaries and infinite extension” 
(p. xx), or, in general, “nondual awareness” (p. xx). 
I believe this type of experience reflects circum-
stances in which, in my own vernacular, the realm 
of the phenomenological happens to be coinciding 
with the realm of the explanatory (which it does not 
always do). That is to say, explanatorily speaking, 
lived subjective experience is always understood 
as a product and property of larger complex, 
highly networked, relational systems, subject to 
the characteristics of nonlinearity, unpredictability, 
disequilibrium, and complexity (in the complexity 
theory sense of the term). It is messy and 
networked, and in that sense has no boundaries. 
Phenomenologically speaking, however, we do 
not necessarily experience ourselves that way, as 
boundary-less, extended, and intensely networked. 
Indeed, we may experience ourselves at times as 
singular, unfettered, agentic, disconnected from the 
world, even alienated, and quite alone with what 
we think of as our personal individuality, our self. 
These instances of our experiencing technically do 
not match up, experientially, with the feel of the 
underlying systems latticework in which we are 
always embedded. Phenomenologically, anything 
goes—all dimensions of experience are possible. And 
sometimes, perhaps in more transcendental states of 
mind, we can experience the fuzzy boundaries and 
infinite extension of which Marks-Tarlow speaks, 
in which case as I alluded to previously, we are 
closer in experience to our originary matrices and 
their infinitely far-reaching networks compared to 
the more singular, isolated-mind mode of living in 
which we typically negotiate our daily lives. Familiar 
experience is pregnant with infinite possibilities.
In addition to working at bridging epistemo-
logical gaps—an enormous undertaking—I especially 
applaud Marks-Tarlow for her scientific and 
mathematical rigor in addressing the unique, the 
novel, and the complex in human nature and 
human experiencing. Fractal geometry, a persuasive 
framework for better appreciating the foundation of our 
emotional lives and our experiences of nonduality, can 
only enhance and extend our clinical work into realms 
unknown to more linear, traditional, and evidence-
based perspectives. Her fractal epistemology is 
indeed a much-needed corrective to the philosophies 
of objectivism, individualism, and traditionalism that 
otherwise unfortunately continue to pervade our field.
Endnotes
1 Quoted from John Keat’s (1817/1899) letter to his 
brothers, George and Thomas.
2 William J. Coburn is Founding Editor Emeritus 
of Psychoanalysis, Self and Context (formerly 
the International Journal of Psychoanalytic Self 
Psychology), Associate Editor of Psychoanalytic 
Dialogues, and an Editorial Board Member of 
Psychoanalytic Inquiry.
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